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"When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single 
proposition, it is a whole system of propositions . . .
Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system 
seme things stand unshakeably fast and same more or less liable to shift. 
What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or con­
vincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it."























































































































































































The problem of maintaining the consistency of state estimates with a 
decision maker's expectations is considered. The discrepancy between the 
estimate and its expectation defines a jump in the state estimate. The 
jump makes the estimate consistent with its expectation. A method is de­
scribed for generating corresponding covariance matrices for the Kalman 
filter in order to make the filter consistent with such a jump. It is 
shewn that the method is able to alter the estimates in the precise di­
rection indicated by the expectations. The corresponding alteration to 
the Kalman gain is also discussed. Convergence becomes evident if expec­
tations become, through learning, increasingly accurate estimates of the 




















































































































































































1. Introduction: The Problem
It is important, for optimal decision making, that the economic conse­
quences of policy measures be predicted accurately and detected quickly. 
Conventional approaches to policy, prediction and detection, have been sub­
ject to a sustained series of theoretical and empirical objections by the
( 1)New Classical Macroeconomists. In particular, the crucial issue of the 
policy invariance of parameters defining the structure of an econometric 
model (used in the formulation and evaluation of policy) has led to a re­
surgence of interest in recursive schemes of estimation. Indeed, it is a 
sign of the times, perhaps, that a classic in applied mathematics: "Pre­
diction and Regulation by Linear Least-Square Methods" (Whittle (1963), 
(1983)), is now republished with the encouragement of a leading exponent of 
the New Classical Paradigm, viz: T.J. Sargent.
Lucas and Sargent, in their influential essay on "After Keynesian Mac­
roeconomics" , point out, for example:
". . . i t  has been only a matter of analytical convenience and not of 
necessity that equilibrium models have used the assumption of stochas­
tically stationary shocks and the assumption that agents have already 
learned the probability distributions they face. Both of these as­
sumptions can be abandoned. . . .  In fact, within the framework of 
quadratic objective functions, in which the 'separation principle' ap­
plies, one can apply the Kalman filtering formula to derive optimum 
linear decision rules with time-dependent coefficients. In this 
framework, the Kalman filter permits a neat application of Bayesian 
learning to updating optimal forecasting rules from period to period 
as new information becomes available."
(Lucas and Sargent (1979), p. 315 in Lucas and Sargent (1981).
Italics added.)
various versions of this paper have been presented at seminars in the Uni­
versities of Lund and Bologna and at the European University in Florence. 
Critical— but constructive— camients by participants at these seminars, as 
well as useful camients by Professors Wolfgang Gebauer and Michael 





























































































We are left with the impression that the magic wand of a Kalman filter re­
stores learning processes in an interesting way in linear rational expecta­
tions models. It is this over-simplification with which we are exclusively 
concerned in our development.
The updating that Lucas and Sargent refer to is via the innovations 
term in the recursive scheme in Kalman filtering and is of an almost me­
chanical Bayesian variety. Initial conditions completely determine the ev­
olution of the conditional densities which are used for prediction and con­
trol. 'As new information becomes available', it is not only the mechani­
cal updating of an estimate on the basis of the description between expect­
ed and realized values, weighted by the Kalman gain, that is crucial: the
Kalman gain itself must be re-examined in terms of the new information that 
becomes available. This latter point has been totally neglected in the ap­
plied New Classical literature (and, indeed, in all applications of Kalman 
filtering techniques in economics)— somewhat understandably, in the initial 
flush of enthusiasm surrounding the exciting possibilities made feasible by 
recursive techniques. There is, obviously, a deeper reason for this ne­
glect— at least by the New Classical Economists. That, of course, is part­
ly due to the modelling philosophy adopted by the New Classicals: there is
only one true model of the economy and a fortiori all agents view the world 
through the canrnonality of this one true model. There seems, therefore, no 
scope for the individual agents to have a set of beliefs of their own, and 
thus to have the possibility of constructing (at least in their minds— and 
hence for intelligent behaviour) models of the economy in which they are 
the actors. All learning is pseudo-learning. Beliefs, conditioning the 
learning processes, are constrained by the postulate of the existence of 
this one true model of the economy.
The prototype for this setting is, of course, Lucas' (1975) essay. In 
that pioneering work, Lucas uses, as state variables, money, capital and an 




























































































tion of an economy-wide average "belief" within the framework of a partial
equilibrium model of investment by trying to formalize, using recursive
techniques, the problem of 1 forecasting the forecast of others1. Thus,
ostensibly, agents are allowed to operate with disparate "beliefs". In a
(2)more recent work concerned with "modelling of the movements of average 
opinion", Townsend attempts to integrate the problem of expectations of 
others' expectations with the standard approach of monistic beliefs in the 
New Classical literature. However, in both cases his attempts fail to 
lead to an interesting breakthrough precisely because the Kalman gain re­
mains invariant. Thus, even as Phelps and Frydman point out:
"The crucial assumption made by Tcwnsend is that although the vector 
of prior means differs across agents, the covariance matrix . . . of 
beliefs is the same."
(Phelps and Frydman, 1983, p. 21.)
Clearly, the libertarian philosophy underlying New Classical Economics 
would benefit from attsrpts to remove this restriction on agents' beliefs. 
We outline a method to relax this restriction in the next section.
In the subsequent discussion we interpret the state of the economy in 
a general manner. The state may be taken to be as a vector of ordinary 
economic variables or a vector of model parameters, considered as time 
varying variables by the decision maker (economic agent). We do not con­
sider combinations of variables and parameters that lead to non-lineari­
ties and thence to the inapplicability of certainty equivalence (but not 
necessarily the separation principle) in optimal decisions. The applica­
tion of the Kalman filter to linear econcmetric models with time varying 
parameters are discussed by Athans (1976) and Rustem and Velupillai 
(1978).
Before concluding this introductory section a minor doctrine-histori­




























































































The connection between recent developments in Macroeconomic methodolo­
gy— particularly in its New Classical variants— and the impressive contri­
butions by Wicksell1s followers in the Stockholm of the '30s is an unwrit­
ten (as yet) chapter of intellectual history. Of the latter it was perhaps
Erik Lindahl who was most uncarprcmisingly theoretical and, as such, most
(3)instrumental in developing new concepts and original frameworks. Long 
before Hayek, and almost simultaneously with Keynes and Knight, Lindahl had 
been grappling with the problem of incorporating intelligent expectation 
formation and its revision by individual economic agents in a monetary mac­
roeconomic setting (cf. Lindahl (1924)). The crucial role played by expec­
tation and its revision in the formulation of monetary policy was almost
(4)the unifying thread in all his macroeconomic writings. It was, there­
fore, not surprising that when he came to write, almost 30 years later, his 
masterly evaluation of 'Keynes1 Economic System1 (cf. Lindahl (1954)), the 
role of expectations and its revision in equilibrium formulation was 
stressed. Although it was a particular technical deficiency in certain New 
Classical models that suggested the questions we have tried to answer in 
this paper, it was, in fact, a re-reading of Lindahl (1954) that gave us 
the hint towards a reasonable solution. It may, therefore, be of some use 
to quote at least a few of the relevant sections from Lindahl (op. cit.):
"It also seems reasonable to postulate an interdependence between the 
variables entering an economic system in the case concerning the de­
termination of the conditions for CORRECTLY ANTICIPATED processes. 
These conditions are that the individuals have such expectations of 
the future that they act in ways which are necessary for their expec­
tations to be fulfilled. It follows that the interdependence between 
present and future magnitudes is conditioned in this case by the fact 
that the latter, via correct anticipations, influence the former. If 
we also choose bo describe such developments as equilibrium processes, 
this implies that we widen the concept of equilibrium to include also 
economic systems describing changes over time where the changes which 
take place from period to period do not cause any interruption in, 
but, on the contrary, are an expression of, the continuing adjustment 
of the variables to each other."




























































































He then gees on to point out that:
"In the construction of these equilibrium processes it is not neces­
sary to presume perfect foresight in the sense that all economic sub­
jects anticipate the actual development with full certainty. It is 
sufficient to presume that the economic subjects which have a deter­
mining influence in their respective markets have anticipated the ac­
tual development as the MOST PROBABLE of various possibilities, in 
which case both their planning and their actions to a certain extent 
are influenced by the presence of uncertainty (the risk factor). 
Further, we need not presume that the anticipations should be correct 
for a long time ahead. But the earlier course of development must 
have been such as to have generated fairly correct anticipations for 
the relevant period. The development must, consequently, be so sta­
ble that, disregarding exogenous factors, it does not cause any great 
surprise in the near future."
(Lindahl (op. cit.), p. 28, second set of italics added. But cf. 
also f.n. 11, p. 28 in Loc. cit.)
The method discussed in the next section observes the discrepancy be­
tween the decision maker's expectations and the corresponding state esti­
mate. This discrepancy defines a jump in the state estimate in order to 
make the filter consistent with such a jump. It is shown that the method 





























































































2. A Method for Updating the Covariance Matrices of the Kalman Filter
In this section a method is discussed for updating the covariance 
matrices of the Kalman Filter. The method is designed to translate the 
decision maker's (or private agent's) expectations of future states of 
the economic system to an update of the covariance matrices. It is shown 
belcw that these updates move the optimal state estimates of the Kalman 
filter in the direction indicated by the policy maker's expectations.
The method is of an iterative nature in that the decision maker is al­
lowed to revise his expectations until a state estimate consistent with 
his requirements is obtained.
Let the system be described, by the linear vector difference equation
trix, G is n x r and {w , k = 1, . . .} is an r-vector white Gaussian se-
Jv.
quence, w, ~ N(0, Q, ). Discrete, linear observations of the system areK. K.
taken at time instants, k, using
and (v^, k = 1, 2, . . .} is an m-vector, white Gaussian sequence, 
v^ ~ N (0, R^) , > 0. xq , {w^}, {v̂ .} are assumed to be independent.
The well-kncwn optimal filter for the discrete system (1), (2) con­
sists of equations of evolution for the state estimate x and its covari­
ance matrix P (see e.g. Jazwinski, 1970). We define
V i  = Fk \  + G V i  - k =  o- 1- • (D
where x^ is the n-vector state at time k, is an n x n nonsingular ma­
yk = \  *k  + vk (2)
(3)






























































































The covariance matrix at observations, corresponding to (3), is defined as
,Ti
Pk|k = E { { \  “ *k|k} (xk ^k|k} ' V  
= E{(\ - sk|k)<xk ‘ \ ! k )T> (5)
with P as an initial condition of the filter. The covariance matrix, be- o
tween observations, corresponding to (4), can be written in view of (1) as
.T,
Pk+1 |k E{ (xk+1 " *k+1 |k} (xk+1 " y"k+1 |k) ' V  
= Fk Pk|k Fk + Gk Qk °k 
The Kalnan filter equations are (4), (6) and




\  = pk|k-i «kT (Hk V - i  “kT + v ' 1




and does not find this esti-Suppose the decision maker carputes x^ | ̂  
mate consistent with his expectations based upon his own perceptions of 
the performance of the economic system. The following scheme provides a 
way in which and subsequently the Kalman filter can be made consist­
ent with these expectations. This leads to an "ultinate" Bayesian frame­
work in which the decision maker can influence the estimate and its covar­
iance iratrix, generated by the Kalman filter.
The method confronts the decision maker with the state estimate *k|k‘
If this is inconsistent with the decision maker's expectations, then he is
asked to specify the estiirate that would be consistent. Let this be St k k
where the superscript e signifies that this is the value consistent with 
his expectations of the state estimate. We define the correction vector




























































































which represents a jump in the state estimate to make it consistent
with the decision maker's expectations. Let be nonsingular and 6 be
the solution of
pkik 4 “ 4
Using 6, we compute a rank-one update of 
Pk|k-1 = PkIk-1 + “ Pk|k-1 6 6 PkIk-1
(11)
(1 2 )
and replace  ̂ in the Hainan filter by P^|k y  where a is a scalar,
chosen to reflect the errphasis of the update in (12). The effect of a is 
also illustrated in the following result:
Preposition (13)
^  \  = Pk !k-1 ^ (Hk pklk-1 «k + V ' ’ t e  ^  Kalm>n ga“  oorre-
sponding to (12). Then
\ =  (I + 3(0,6) Pk | k 6 7 ) ^
where




Let Pk |k = pk |k_-| - Pvllj> be the covariance matrix (5) correspond­
ing to (12), then
Pklk Pk|k + 6(a' 6) Pk|k 6 6 Pk|k (16)
Let 5^ jk be the estimate corresponding to (12), then
\ | k * xk|k + li<“' 4) 4
where
,“Tli(a, 6) A 6 (a, 6) (6 (yk - S ^ j ^ ) )
and u(a, 6) > 0 if
(17)
(18)




























































































« ? p kik-i>
and a > 0. If (19) is not satisfied, then y(a, 6) > 0 for 
0 > a > - 1 / ( 6 rKkHkPk|k_1« .
Proof
To evaluate K^, we use P̂ ĵ . -j given by (12) and evaluate the resulting 
expression using the Sherman-Morrison formula (Householder, 1964). We have
\  -  (Pk |k -1  + ^ k l k - l  « 5 T Pk |k - 1 > < (Hk (Pk |k -1  + < ® k |w  « ?  Pk |k - 1 > < + v ' 1
= ^  + etc, «> Pk M  « 7  \  \  h£ + V ' 1
- s ( “ '  « Pk |k -1  ^ (V k | k - i  <  + V ' 1 V k |k - 1  « ?  Pk |k -1  > i (Hkpk | k - i ^ + V ' 1
= ^  + Bh», «> <Pk M  - *k
which, in view of (8), can be written as (14) . The covariance matrix P ^ ^  
can be evaluated using
pk|k  = (pk | k - i + “V - i * ?  pk|k- i> -  \  + ^ k i k - i  
“ <Pk|k-1 -  W k |k - 1 >  + a(Pk|k-1 -  \  “k pk |k -l>  ‘ 7  Pk |k —1 
-B ta , « » k M  -  W k i k - 1 »  1 7  (W k | k - 1  + a < ?  V k Pk|k-1«> Pk|k-1>
Using (8), this can be written as
Pk |k  = Pk |k  + ^ k l k  6 S Pk |k -1
-B (c , 6) PR|k 6 ? ( - P k |k  + d  + « ( ?  \  \Pk M «> Pk M »
which, in view of (15) , yields (16). The state estimate is obtained
frcm
*k|k = *k|k-1 + \ (yk "  \  \|k-1} 
and using (14) we obtain
\ | k = \ | m  + l l ta' S) pk | k s
which, \asing (11) yields the result (17). y(a, 6) > 0 follows fran (19) 





























































































P i and P . are positive (semi-)definite if P , 1 and P, , areK K*“1 K|K K j K“ I K|K
positive (semi-)definite. This can be confirmed by inspection of (12) and 
(16) respectively for a > 0 or for sufficiently small |a| , a < 0.
Renerk (21)
Expression (16) shows that P^jk need not be recalculated when P^|k .j 
is altered by (12). The rank-one modification in (16) yields the required 
covariance matrix.
Remark (22)
If Pk |k  ̂ is positive definite or, otherwise, if a 6 can be specified 
T  -such that 6 P , . S ^ 0, then one choice for a is given by.K. K~ I
a = 1/(6TPk jk ^6) which, in view of (15) yields B(a, 6) = 1 / ( 6 (I + K^H^)Pfc| ^ 5) ). 
An example of negative a is
a = -1/(?Pkjk_1 6) (23)
provided P , remains positive semi-definite. In view of (8), (15) thisK. K“ l
yields
B(a, 6) = -1/(?Pk |k6)
Note that, for this choice, P^|k = pk |k(5 = 0. 
a is
a = 1/(F \ ( y k - ^  -
(24)
An alternative choice for 
6)
which ensures y (a,6) = 1. This can only be achieved with a > 0 when
?  ^  \ik-i1 > ? ? \ H P k|k-i «
It can be observed frcm (12) and (16) that Pk |k  ̂ and ?k |k  ̂ can be auto­
matically ensured to be positive (semi-)definite for a > 0. Nevertheless, 
negative values of a may still be acceptable provided these covariance ma­





























































































The non-negativity condition (19) on 6 can clearly be relaxed. This 
condition implies that the chosen 6 should be at an acute angle with the 
innovations term K^(y^ - _^) in (7). This, in turn, implies that
the decision maker's expectations of the state of the economy should not 
entirely contradict the direction, x^j^ - 1 which the filter, based
on the latest available information, has chosen in order to correct the
previous estimate *k|k-1 This restriction is, nevertheless, only neces-
sary to ensure the positive (semi-)definiteness of with
a > 0. Therefore, it can be relaxed, if necessary, to allow for general 
6 provided a takes negative values such that y (a, 6) > 0  whenever
—T6 K^(y^ - )̂ £ 0. It should be noted that in this case, as in
Proposition (13), |a| can be chosen small enough to maintain the positive
~T “(semi-)definiteness of the covariance matrices, for a £ (-1/(6 K^H^P^|^ 6̂) ,0)
Remark (26)
The significance of (17) is that, provided y(a, 6) > 0, the estimate 
5ĉ |k is given by a correction of x^ ̂  in the precise direction 6, speci­
fied by the decision maker. This is clearly a desirable property in that 
it allows the estimate 5 ^ ^  to be corrected consistently with both the 
decision maker's expectations and the filter itself.
Remark (27)
The new Kalman gain, given by (14), is affected by 6, specified by 
the decision maker. It is also a function of P^|k , as opposed to giv­
en by (9) which is a function of P^|k  ̂ but not
At any given time k, the updating process (12) can be repeated iter­
atively, if necessary, resulting in several evaluations of (17) in which 
x^|^ is relabelled x ^ ^  a^ter each evaluation. The practical importance 




























































































belled P, ,, , P, ,, „ after each evaluation) becomes evident if such itera- kIk k|k-1
tions are undertaken.
3. Forecasts Consistent with Expectations
Suppose, given the information at time k, Y , the forecasted state
estimate given by (4), is found to be inconsistent with the deci-
0sion maker's expectations. Let ^  be the state expected by the deci­
sion maker and let
6' = *k+1 Ik *k+1 |k (27)
be the correction vector, representing a jump in the state estimate ^  
to make it consistent with the decision maker's expectations. In order to 
m k e  the filter consistent with these expectations, a corresponding jump 
in ^k|k îaS ^  determined. Let this jump be 6 as in (10), then by (4)
_e
\+i|k = V i ] k  + S' = F k (xk|k + s)
-1and, as F is nonsingular, 6 = F^ S' 
from (17)
Using (11) and (12), we obtain
\ | k  = V + u(a’ S)S
\ +H k  = Fk (\ | k  + ll(“ ' S)6)
= sk+iik + u(a' S)6'
Thus, the old forecast state estimate x ^  ̂  is corrected with a jump in 
the specified direction 6', to yield the new forecast Hence, the
method in Section 2 can be applied to adjust state forecasts according to 




























































































4. The Rationalization of Expected Values of with the Filter
Suppose, at time k, the decision maker's expected value of y , denoted
0by y , is different from the observed value. We set
.K.
« A yk - yk (28)
as the corresponding jump in the observed values. In economics, observed 
data is often subsequently revised. This indicates that the decision maker 
might well be not entirely convinced with the observed y^. Thus, the deci­
sion maker might crediby have sane expected value, different frcm the one 
observed. A related reason for such an expected value nay be that, at or 
just after the observation at k, events have occurred or are expected to
occur, that will rapidly alter the observed value y^ towards the expected 
0value y^. The decision naker can thus no longer use the estimate x y  ̂  (7),
but has to revise this estimate to \ | k in order to make it consistent with
V
To obtain the estimate xCk|k , u.k
we use the following rank one formula to update
R^ = R^ + a ôôT
where a is a scalar.
, consistent with y and with the filter,
(29)
Proposition
\  = pk |k - i < (Hkpk | k - i ^ + V '1 ' then





B(a, 6) A a/(1 + a ô ^ t y y ^ H ^  + Rfc) 16) 
k|k = Pk|k-1 " W c ^ k - I '  then






























































































for \ | k  - \ | k - i + \ (yk - "k *k|k-i>
\ | k  = \ | k  + 5(a' S) Kk { (34)
where
S(a, «) A i(a, «> h£ + V ' X  \|k-1 ' yk>
* and
y(a, 6) > 0 (35)
if a > 0 and
6'I'(HkI?k|k-1Hk + V ' 1 (Hk *k|k-1 - Yk> ^ ° (36)
If (36) is not satisfied, then (35) is still satisfied for 
0 > a > - 1 / X k l k - X  + Pk)'1«
Proof
We have
K  - pk|k-i^(Bkpk | k - i ^ + 5c - “5sT>'1
- pk i k - i \ < V k i k - ^ + v ' 1«  - i(“'5)5{T(V k i k - i ^ + V 1>
which yields (31). P^j 
ing (31). Inequality (35) follows from the positive definiteness of
(HkPk |k - l5 c  + V  ’
The matrix P^j^ has, as in Section 2, to be ensured to remain positive 
(semi-)definite. This can be done for positive a or for negative a with 
|a| sufficiently small.
Condition (35) on 6, as condition (19), can clearly be relaxed by us­
ing negative a with |a| sufficiently small.
in (33) and *kH in (34) can simply be derived us-
Substituting (7) into (34) yields




























































































which illustrates the effect of (28) in that the innovations term now uses 
yk + y(a, 6)6 instead of y^. Thus, the observation y^ is shifted by a jump 
proportional to that specified by the decision maker's expectations.
5. The Rationalization of Expected Future Observed Values with the Filter
If the forecast value of y ^ , given y^, is 
?k+1 |k = \  *k+l |k = \  Fk *k|k
and if this value differs from the value expected by the decision maker,
0denoted by y^+^, it is possible to generate a state estimate ^ which
0 0is consistent with expectation y^ . The existence of such y^+  ̂ assumes 
seme anticipation of future events. This, in turn, invalidates well-knewn 
assumptions of nonanticipativity which imply that the decision maker (con­
troller) is not clairvoyant (see e.g. Wonham, 1968). Let
6y = yk+1 “ ?k+1|k
The corresponding jump in the state ^  is 61. This jump is the solu­
tion of
% +1 | k + S y = Hk <Xk+1 |k + 6,)
and is given by
6' = 6y (37)
with 6y — 6y. We then use this value as 6' in Section 3 to yield
W - ^ W - n k  <xk+i!k + p<a' ®  6’>
where, as in Section 3, 6 = F ^  6' and y(a, 6) and 6 are given by (17) and.K.
(11). From (37) we have
?k+1 Ik Ik + y ( a ' 6) 6y





























































































ter so that the observation forecast h . is shifted in the precise di-Jk+1|k
rection indicated by the decision maker's expectations.
Concluding Notes
The method in Section 2 also indicates the existence of a convergence 
problem: does the state estimate generated by the filter converge to the 
true state estimate? The convergence of the Kalman filter being a sepa­
rate issue, the answer seems to be affirmative if there is a learning 
process in which the decision maker's expectations become, through learn­
ing, increasingly accurate estimates of the corresponding state vector
u -e - 6 = \ | k  - V = 0 “  (10) or { =  *k+i|k - *k+i|k= 0111 (27)) or
0if the expected and actual observations converge (i.e. 6 = y^ - yk = 0 in 
(30)).
It would .‘be unrealistic to postulate identical adjustment parameters .
a and 6 over all agents. Surely Lucas is right when he asserts that:
"The assumption of rational expectations is appealing /in the context 
of yielding important insights into the workings of market economies/ 
not only because by applying the principle of optimization to the ac­
quisition of information it maintains an internally consistent frame­
work, but also because it limits to seme extent the range of possible 
outcomes."
(Lucas, 1984, p. 1653. Italics added.)
But then 'acquisition of information' is pre-eminently a sequential proc­
ess and by making explicit the nature of the modifications necessary to 
relax the assumption of an invariant Kalman Gain we have, it is hoped, 
cast scane new light on the constraints imposed on agents in New Classical 
Models.
If we are to consider seriously the problem of modelling expectations 
and therefore that of 'forecasting the forecasts of others', it is clear 




























































































to which the ethical, aesthetic and economic components of value determine 
the strictly economic behaviour of agents is of crucial importance in imput­
ing intelligent and useful values for the adjustment parameters a and 6. It 
will no longer be purely a question of imperfect information in the limited 
sense of confusing local and global information structures. It is, instead, 
a question of incomplete perception of the ethical, aesthetic and economic 
ccnponents of the individual agent's value system.
In the review of Grandmont from which we have quoted from Lucas above 
(Lucas, op. cit.) he went on to cast seme doubt on the former's approach to 
modelling expectations:
"Grandmont' s analysis in contrast /to RE/ demonstrates that if expecta­
tions are purely subjective then anything can happen and probably 
will. . . . "
(Lucas, op. cit., p. 1653. Italics added.)
However, the moral of the story we have developed seems to be that Lib­
ertarian modelling propped up by unbridled utilitarianism is as undesirable 
— if not unpractical— as unconstrained subjectivism. Rawls, faced with the 
same dilentna, appealed to intuiticnism to get tempered utilitarianism as a 
workable alternative. This seems to us to be a most premising avenue to ex­
plore, especially in the variants introduced by Harsanyi and his followers 
to incorporate, in addition to strictly economic components of value, also 
ethical and other considerations (cf. Harsanyi, 1977, §3.6 in conjunction 
with ch. 4 of the same book). ̂  To same extent Harsanyi's tracing proce­
dure, within a framework in which agents' preference functions incorporate 
also ethical considerations, is a sequential updating procedure to which the 
method we have developed can be applied (cf. Harsanyi (1979)).
There remains, finally, the almost unanswerable question whether the 
stochastic calculus and linear rational expectation models are the best that 
modem 'theoretical technology' can offer us for macroeconomic modelling 




























































































such tools? As followers of a method popularized by Mitchell and the NRER, 
and as believers in the positivistic philosophy endorsed by Friedman, there 
may be some consistency in New Classical over-indulgence with the elementary 
tools of the stochastic calculus. But 'theoretical technology' offers, for 
those who seek, also other and more exotic tools. The theory of dynamical 
systems, in particular, and the vast vistas opened by Mandelbrot's (1983) 
explorations in the "Fractal Geometry of Nature" are two convenient exam­
ples. The problem of the 'Business Cycle' is, inherently, a dynamic prob­
lem. The Lucasians have studied it with the exclusive use of the tools of 
stochastic calculus. The concepts in their theoretical formulation have 
thus been developed within the limits imposed by such tools. An approach to 
the problem of the dynamics of 'Business Cycles' with other tools, as men­
tioned above, nay prove even more fruitful in interpreting the role of the 
individual agent in his social setting— and hence that much more useful in 






























































































(1) By New Classical Macroeconamists or Lucasians we denote the class of eco­
nomic model builders whose assumptions are predicated by, at least, the fol­
lowing postulates for the agents and values that characterize the economy:
(a) Rational Expectations
(b) Equilibrium Values (i.e., Auction Market Clearing) and
(c) Inperfect Information.
It is only the technical aspects of (a) (and, to some extent (c)), that are 
of concern to us for the subject natter of this paper. In fact, however, the 
assunption of "Auction Market Clearing" is more about centralization and 
knowledge than about rationality. There is, therefore, a curious inconsist­
ency in the triple pillars that characterize the New Classicals and to con­
centrate, as we do here, on (a) and (c) alone is not unjustified, at least 
frcm a theoretical and methodological point of view.
(2) We have not had access to it except in the form of the summary in the 
introductory essay by Phelps and Frydrren in the volume which contains 
Townsend's recent essay.
(3) New Classical Macroeconomists (Lucas in particular) have, indeed, made 
attempts to link their work with the developments in monetary and business 
cycle theory in the 20s and 30s. In particular the theoretical work of Hayek 
and Knight and the NBER statistical methodology have been important sources 
of inspiration for the 'Rational Macroeconomists' (cf. also Fitoussi- 
Velupillai (1984)). However, the work of the Swedes seems to have entirely 
escaped their notice.
(4) This qualification ("macroeconomic writings") is mainly to distinguish 





























































































(5) We would perhaps endorse an even further step 'beyond utilitarianism' 
and go all the way to formalization in terms of deontic logic. That, on the 
other hand, irrplies considerable imprecision in outcomes and, hence, incom­
patible with the simpler variants of positivism underlying standard statis­
tical methodology. It is, perhaps, the price we must pay for recognizing 
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